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Capital lessons
 Labour, inequality and how to respond
Özlem Onaran and  
Alexander Guschanski
A sharp drop in the wage share in GDP in the UK since the 
1980s has been accompanied by a jump in income share of the top 
1 per cent. Rather than migration or technological change, increased 
capital mobility, decline in collective bargaining, labour market 
deregulation, austerity and rising household debt are to blame.
[Correction added on 25 September 2017, after Online and Print publication: Corrections have 
been made to Figure 1]
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There has been a significant decline in the share of  wages in GDP in the UK since the 1980s. This has been accompanied by another trend towards greater inequality in personal income distribution, particularly 
by increases in income shares of  the top 1 per cent of  the distribution. We 
have recently analysed the causes of  the decline in the wage share in developed 
and developing countries for a project for the Institute of  New Economic 
Thinking, and this paper summarises our findings for the UK.42
“The fall in the share of wages in national 
income and stagnation in wages have been 
two of the fundamental flaws in the UK’s 
economic model”
The share of  wages in GDP in the UK fell from its peak of  74.1 per cent 
in 1975 to 69.2 per cent in 2014 (figure 1). Low-skilled services experienced 
a reduction in the wage share from the mid-1990s until 2007. Low-skilled 
manufacturing sectors have also lost out compared to the early 1980s. The 
wage share in high-skilled service sectors in 2014 was still 6 percentage-
points lower than its value of  74 per cent in the mid-1980s and the wage 
share in high-skilled manufacturing in 2014 was 10 percentage-points lower 
than its peak in 1981 at 72 per cent.
42  Full details of  the research project can be found here: https://www.ineteconomics.org/
research/grants/the-causes-of-falling-wage-share-and-prospects-for-growth-with-equality-in-a-
globalized-economy
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Figure 1: Wage share in the UK in different sectors (labour 
compensation as a ratio to value added, adjusted for self-employed 
labour income), 1970-2014 
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Source: Own calculations based on EU KLEMS. The graph for the total wage share includes all 
sectors. HS and LS stand for high and low skilled sectors respectively. Sector level graphs exclude: 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; and Mining and Quarrying; Coke and Refined 
Petroleum; Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security; Education; Human 
Health and Social Work Activities and Real Estate.43
The fall in the share of  wages in national income and stagnation in wages 
have been two of  the fundamental flaws in the UK’s economic model and 
were at the root of  the Great Recession. We are far from correcting this 
imbalance. Real pay is still lower compared to its peak in early 2008. After 
the longest and most dramatic period of  decline in real wages since the 
Victorian times, waged and salaried people in Britain are once again under 
pressure due to the uncertainty and higher inflation rates caused by the 
depreciation of  the pound after Brexit.
The EU Referendum in the UK in 2016 laid bare long-existing divisions 
in the country. The link between the result and increasing inequality – and 
in particular the impact of  migration on inequality – has received much 
43  See Guschanski and Onaran (2017) for further details
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attention. Our analysis shows that inequality in the UK did not increase 
because of  migration, i.e. mobility of  labour. Instead, our analysis suggests 
it was caused by two related factors. The first was the increased fallback 
options for capital to increase its profitability through greater geographic 
mobility of  capital in the form of  foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
financialisation (increased options in investing in financial vs. real assets). 
The second was the declining availability of  fallback options for labour, 
related to, variously, the decline in collective bargaining power, deregulation 
of  the labour market, zero hours contracts and false self-employed 
contracts, austerity, the housing crisis and rising household debt (itself  
related to financialisation and inequality). As our data shows, this is not a 
new phenomenon but a process that gained momentum from the 1980s, 
when increased globalisation and neoliberalism initiated a poisonous mix 
of  austerity, deregulation of  product and labour markets and slashing of  
workers’ rights. 
CAUSES OF THE FALL IN THE WAGE SHARE
We analyse the wage share (labour compensation as a ratio to value added) and 
real wage (labour compensation as a ratio to people engaged) in the UK using 
sectoral data for the period of  1970-201444. The mainstream argument in the 
literature, informed by neoclassical theory – as most prominently represented 
by the IMF45, European Commission46 and Bassanini and Manfredi47 – 
is that technological change is the primary determinant of  falling wage 
shares, followed by globalisation. On the contrary, building on the political 
economy approach48 49 50, we analyse the potential negative effects, not only of  
technological change and globalisation, but also of  financialisation, and the 
44  We use EU Klems, OECD, and World Input-Output datasets. See Guschanski and Onaran 
(2016, 17) for details. The analysis is based on country specific econometric estimations based 
on sectoral data (Guschanski and Onaran, 2016) as well as pooled estimations of  countries and 
sectors (Guschanski and Onaran, 2017).
45  International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2007) ‘The globalization of  labor’ World Economics 
Outlook April 2007, pp.161-192, IMF
46  European Commission (EC) (2007), ‘The labour income share in the European Union’ Em-
ployment in Europe, pp. 237-272, European Commission
47  Bassanini A and Manfredi T (2012), ‘Capital’s Grabbing Hand? A Cross-country/Cross-in-
dustry Analysis of  the Decline of  the Labour Share’, OECD Social, Employment and Migration 
Working Papers No.133
48  Guschanski A and Onaran, Ö (2016), ‘Determinants of  the wage share: a cross-country 
comparison using sectoral data’, Greenwich Papers in Political Economy, University of  Greenwich. 
http://gala.gre.ac.uk/15847/
49  Guschanski A and Onaran Ö (2017), ‘The political economy of  functional income distribu-
tion: industry level evidence from the OECD’, Greenwich Papers in Political Economy, University 
of  Greenwich
50  Stockhammer E (2016), ‘Determinants of  the wage share: a panel analysis of  advanced and 
developing economies’, British Journal of  Industrial Relations
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decline in government spending and trade unions on the bargaining power 
of  labour, and hence the wage share. We analyse the effects separately in 
manufacturing and service industries, and also distinguish between sectors 
using predominantly high and low-skilled labour. 
Falling bargaining power of  labour has reduced the wage share
There has been a strong decline in union density (the ratio of  the number 
of  employees who are members of  trade unions to all the employees) for all 
industries in the UK. While this is a general trend in all countries, the decline 
has been greatest in the UK starting in the 1980s after Thatcherite policies. 
Union density in aggregate in the UK decreased by 24.4 percentage points 
from 49.9 per cent in 1981 to 25.4 per cent in 2013. Similarly, collective 
bargaining coverage has seen the greatest decline in the UK, from its peak 
of  80 per cent in 1979 to 31.2 per cent in 2011. Union density is highest in 
manufacturing sectors and lowest in low-skilled service sectors.
“There has been a strong decline in union 
density (the ratio of the number of employees 
who are members of trade unions to all the 
employees) for all industries in the UK”
Our results show that collective bargaining coverage and union density have 
a robust and strong positive effect of  on wage share in the UK, which is 
clearly driven by high and low-skilled manufacturing sectors. 
Additionally, our results show that government social spending (on 
health, education, social care) has a strong positive impact on wage share. 
Government social spending is considered as social wage, which affects 
the bargaining power of  labour via the provision of  in-kind social services 
such as health, social care and education. The cuts in social spending during 
years of  neoliberalism and austerity have had a clear negative effect on the 
bargaining power of  labour and the wage share. 
We also find a negative impact of  personal income inequality on the wage 
share in the UK. The rise in personal income inequality, in particular, the 
income share of  the top percentile, affects the command over resources 
and power relations. Increasing economic and political power in the hands 
of  a narrow elite circle leads to regulatory capture, and limits redistribution. 
It also shapes the rules in areas ranging from corporate governance to 
product and labour market regulation in their interest. 
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Globalisation of  capital and trade has reduced the wage share
The broad trend of  globalisation has brought with it increased options for 
firms to relocate to other countries or offshore fragments of  their value 
chain. The terrain on which trade unions must confront firms has altered 
dramatically over the last two decades as a result of  changes in the way 
production is organised. Rather than concentrating activities under a single 
roof, and maintaining tight control over the whole production process, 
firms can now coordinate their activities in increasingly complex and 
dispersed ways, involving offshoring and networked collaborations. The 
increasing prominence of  multinational companies that are structured in 
this way exerts further negative pressure on workers’ bargaining power, for 
instance through the increasing use of  relocation threat to gain concessions 
in negotiations. 
Globalisation of  markets for goods, services, capital and labour reduces 
some workers’ wages by placing them in direct competition with workers 
around the world, creating winners and losers. There is increasing concern 
that this will eventually lead to political backlash and protectionism as losers 
cast their vote.
“Globalisation of markets for goods, 
services, capital and labour reduces some 
workers’ wages by placing them in direct 
competition with workers around the world, 
creating winners and losers”
We find a negative effect of  outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI, 
as a ratio to the number of  employees) on the wage share driven by 
manufacturing and service sectors. Outward FDI has a positive impact on 
average wages, but the negative impact on the wage share indicates that 
the wage increases fall behind the rise in productivity. There is also some 
evidence of  the negative effect of  international outsourcing (intermediate 
imports as a ratio to domestic demand) in manufacturing, but the effect is 
rarely statistically significant. Both FDI and offshoring relocate the whole 
production chain, or segments of  it, abroad, putting domestic workers 
in direct competition with workers in other countries, where labour 
costs can be much lower. FDI can improve the global market share for 
multinational firms; but gains in profitability seem not to be shared by 
their workers at home. 
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The globalisation of  labour: more migration need not lead to lower wage share if  
unions and regulations are strong
The impact of  labour migration on wages is theoretically ambiguous. 
It depends on whether migrant labour takes the place of  native labour, 
pushing down wages, or acts as a complement to local labour, not a 
direct competitor. The channels through which migration affects wages 
can, very broadly, be differentiated between the impact of  migration on 
productivity and employment. Previous research has shown that migration 
is related to increased innovation (measured by the registration of  patents) 
and is therefore positively linked to productivity in the UK. Migrants to 
the UK also have a higher education qualification than the average British 
worker51 52. Depending on the nature of  the technological advancement 
and the bargaining power of  labour, this could lead to an increase in 
both wages and the wage share. Migrants might increase the overall skill 
level of  the workforce and open up new business areas. Technological 
advancement and new business opportunities might increase demand for 
domestic workers. Furthermore, migrants often bring knowledge about 
markets and economies in their home countries and therefore open the 
possibility for expansion to new export markets, which might have a 
positive impact on the wage share53 54. Low-skilled migrants do not always 
replace domestic labour if  their labour supply as well as demand increases 
the overall demand for labour in the economy. 
“...migrants often bring knowledge about 
markets and economies in their home 
countries and therefore open the possibility for 
expansion to new export markets, which might 
have a positive impact on the wage share”
In the UK, the share of  foreign workforce (by nationality) as a part of  the 
total workforce increased from 2.8 per cent in 1984 to 7.6 per cent in 201055. 
51  Rolfe, H, Rienzo C, Lalani M, and Portes J (2013), Migration and productivity: employers’ practices, 
public attitudes and statistical evidence, National Institute of  Economic and Social Research.  
http://www.niesr.ac.uk/publications/migration-and-productivity-employ-
ers%E2%80%99-practices-public-attitudes-and-statistical#.V3wx8-srKUk 
52  Saleheen J and Shadforth C (2006), The economic characteristics of  immigrants and their 
impact on supply, Bank of  England Quarterly Bulletin, 4:374-385
53  Huber P, Landesmann M, Robinson C and Stehrer R (2010) ‘Migrants’ Skill and Productivity: 
A European Perspective.’ National Institute Economic Review, 213(1), 20–34
54  Rolfe et al
55  Guschanski and Onaran (2016)
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We find a very robust positive impact of  the foreign workforce on the wage 
share as well as real wages in both manufacturing and service sectors alike. 
The econometric estimation indicates a positive after controlling for all other 
potential factors that may have an impact on the wage share and wages, 
in particular union density, imports, FDI, and technological change. Most 
importantly, contrary to common wisdom, the impact is especially significant 
and positive in the low-skilled service sectors, again on both wages and the 
wage share. Despite academic evidence56 regarding the positive impact of  
migration on productivity in the UK, it is interesting that the increase in wages 
seems to be strong enough to more than offset the impact of  migration on 
productivity and lead to a rise in the wage share as well. Obviously, there is 
need for more research on the reasons why increased immigration is associated 
with a higher wage rate, as well as the impact of  migration on different types 
of  native workers, using sectoral average wage data and individual household 
labour force survey data. We would rather not draw too strong conclusions 
about the positive impact of  migration on wages in particular; however on a 
cautious note, evidence based on our results as well as literature indicate that 
if  unions and regulations are strong, migration need not lead to lower wages, 
lower wage share and worse working conditions.
Financialisation has had a negative impact on the wage share
Financial activities and the prominence of  financial institutions have 
gained momentum since the 1980s. Similar to globalisation, this process 
of  financialisation has increased the fallback options for capital, which 
can now be more easily invested in various financial assets. Furthermore, 
financialisation changed industrial relations and led to a ‘shareholder value 
orientation’ as a consequence of  hostile takeovers of  listed companies. 
Financialised firms adopt a ‘downsize and distribute’ strategy, which reduces 
prospects for labour to agree on a beneficial compromise. Financialisation, 
coupled with house price bubbles, has also had important impacts on 
households, above all through a remarkable rise in household debt. 
“Financialisation, coupled with house price 
bubbles, has also had important impacts on 
households, above all through a remarkable 
rise in household debt”
56  Rolfe et al
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In the UK, we find a robust negative effect of  household debt and 
financial payments of  non-financial corporations (dividends and interest) 
on the wage share in both manufacturing and service sectors alike. This 
finding complements recent research that finds a negative impact of  
financialisation on investment of  non-financial companies57. Financial 
income of  non-financial corporations, on the other hand, has a positive 
impact in some specifications.
Technological change has not been the main driver of  rising inequality in the UK
Recent mainstream literature emphasises how technological progress in the 
last decades was driven by Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT), that allowed workers to be replaced by machines carrying out easily 
automatised tasks. Technological progress contributed to a decline in the 
price of  capital relative to labour, leading to an increase in the capital-output 
ratio, and has led to a fall in the wage share, particularly of  the unskilled 
workers. In the UK, as elsewhere, there has been a significant increase in the 
ICT capital across all sectors. However, we do not find a significant negative 
effect of  ICT or non-ICT capital on the wage share in the UK when other 
factors mentioned above are controlled for. Hence, technological change 
has not been the main driver of  rising inequality in the UK. 
LESSONS FOR POLICY 
Negative effects of  openness or global integration are not an unavoidable 
destiny, rather an outcome of  current domestic and international policies. 
Since the 1980s, the UK has been the leader in damaging austerity, low-
wage and precarious employment practices in the name of  flexibility, and 
financialisation. The fall in the wage share has been a deliberate outcome of  
policies that led to the fall in the bargaining power of  labour, welfare state 
retrenchment and financialisation. 
“Both the UK and its trade partners in 
Europe as a whole are strong enough to 
pursue an egalitarian, wage-led growth 
strategy and would benefit from a 
coordinated boost to the wage share”
57  Tori D and Onaran Ö (2015), ‘The effects of  financialization on investment: Evidence from 
firm-level data for the UK’, Greenwich Papers in Political Economy, University of  Greenwich. 
http://gala.gre.ac.uk/14068/
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The combination of  these policies has led to the vicious circle of  rising 
inequality, financialisation, chronically low demand, a slowdown in 
accumulation and productivity, and low growth and fewer or bad quality 
jobs58 59 60. The empirical evidence shows that to break this vicious circle we 
need alternative economic policies based on a coordinated policy mix of  
equality-led development and public investment. We have strong empirical 
evidence to reject the myth that we cannot have pro-labour policies in the 
age of  globalisation. Both the UK and its trade partners in Europe as a 
whole are strong enough to pursue an egalitarian, wage-led growth strategy 
and would benefit from a coordinated boost to the wage share. As such, 
the UK and other progressives in Europe could, and should, take a step 
forward in terms of  radically reversing the fall in the wage share globally. 
The strategy of  a wage-led development requires labour market policies 
aiming at pre-distribution as well as redistribution. These include 
strengthening the bargaining power of  labour, ensuring higher collective 
bargaining coverage, increasing the statutory minimum wage to the level of  
a living wage, enforcing gender equality, ending public sector pay freezes, 
banning zero hours contracts, enforcing pay ratios between companies’ top 
paid and lowest paid to moderate high pay, and restoring a progressive tax 
system. Furthermore, income distribution policies need to be embedded 
into a broader macroeconomic and industrial policy mix targeting equality, 
full employment and ecological sustainability. This requires regulating 
finance and implementing a public investment programme centred on 
substantial public investment in green physical infrastructure in renewable 
energy, public transport and housing and social infrastructure in care, 
education and health. Free movement of  labour in this context is much 
more likely to positively contribute to the local communities. Appropriate 
public infrastructure ensures that there is an adequate supply of  health, 
education and care services and housing in a vibrant community. 
There is no evidence migration has increased inequality
The quick conclusions related to the impact of  immigration on inequality, 
without adequately decomposing the impact of  all other factors, misses 
58  Ibid
59  Onaran Ö and Obst T 2016 ‘Wage-led growth in the EU15 Member States: The effects of  
income distribution on growth, investment, trade balance, and inflation’, Cambridge Journal of  
Economics, Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/bew009
60  Obst T, Onaran Ö and Nikolaidi M (2017) The effect of  income distribution, public spending 
and taxes on growth, investment, and budget balance: The case of  Europe, Greenwich Papers in 
Political Economy, No 43, University of  Greenwich. http://gala.gre.ac.uk/16088/
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the point that correlation is not causation. The simultaneous rise in 
immigration and inequality does not mean that the former causes the latter. 
After accounting for the impact of  reduced union power, cuts in social 
spending, imports and FDI, we fail to find a negative impact of  migration 
on the wage share. This debate on migration based on myths also misses 
how migrants contribute to overcoming the care deficit in an ageing society, 
an especially striking fact given that a majority of  voters over 65 years 
voted to leave, and that migrants are net contributors to the social security 
system. Migrants are visible to the people, but what firms and offshore tax 
havens do is less visible and comprehensible. The real solution to inequality 
requires focussing on the real causes of  the problem. In an alternative 
economy where the balance of  power shifts in favour of  labour and unions 
have a strong voice, if  migrants come to work, it is possible for the terms 
and conditions under which they work to be set by the local workforce. 
Conversely, in the current situation where the bargaining power of  workers 
has been dramatically eroded with respect to capital, high capital mobility 
and low wages in Eastern Europe and worldwide, firms will relocate or 
offshore parts of  their production abroad, even if  migration can be limited 
after Brexit. If  migrants are not allowed to come, firms will go to them, and 
it is a lot harder to set conditions of  work abroad to avoid a global race to 
the bottom in wages.  
Openness and regional integration can be managed to benefit both the 
richer and poorer partners if  trade and investment flows are designed as 
part of  an egalitarian and growth-oriented international economic policy 
aiming at high road labour market policies. In the European context, labour 
movements have more common ground than they currently exploit. There 
is scope for international cooperation to overcome the coordination failure.
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